Climate Change Uncertainty Quantification: Lessons Learned from the Joint EU-USNRC Project on Uncertainty Analysis of Probabilistic Accident Consequence Codes by Cooke, Roger M. & Kelly, G.N.
1616 P St. NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
202-328-5000   www.rff.org     
 





Lessons Learned from the Joint EU-
USNRC Project on Uncertainty 
Analysis of Probabilistic Accident 
Consequence Codes 
 


















© 2010 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be reproduced without 
permission of the authors. 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. 
They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review. 
Climate Change Uncertainty Quantification: Lessons Learned from 
the Joint EU-USNRC Project on Uncertainty Analysis of 
Probabilistic Accident Consequence Codes 
Roger M.Cooke and G.N. Kelly 
Abstract 
Between 1990 and 2000 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commission of the 
European Communities conducted a joint uncertainty analysis of accident consequences for nuclear 
power plants.  This study remains a benchmark for uncertainty analysis of large models involving high 
risks with high public visibility, and where substantial uncertainty exists. The study set standards with 
regard to structured expert judgment, performance assessment,  dependence elicitation and modeling and 
uncertainty propagation of high dimensional distributions with complex dependence.   The integrated 
assessment models for the economic effects of climate change also involve high risks and large 
uncertainties, and interest in conducting a proper uncertainty analysis is growing. This article reviews the 
EU-USNRC effort and extracts lessons learned, with a view toward informing a comparable effort for the 
economic effects of climate change.    
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Climate Change Uncertainty Quantification: Lessons Learned from 
the Joint EU-USNRC Project on Uncertainty Analysis of 
Probabilistic Accident Consequence Codes 
Roger M. Cooke and G.N. Kelly∗ 
Introduction 
Few subjects are as important, and at the same time as uncertain, as the consequences of 
climate change. The historical record is ambiguous, the models used to predict climate impacts 
are uncertain, and the consequences of different outcomes range from the beneficial to the 
catastrophic. Quantifying uncertainty through a transparent and validated process deserves a high 
priority. Many of these features, albeit on a smaller scale, characterize risks from nuclear power 
plants. Considerable effort has been devoted to defensible and transparent quantification of 
uncertainties in this area. This paper extracts lessons learned for climate change uncertainty 
quantification from the uncertainty analysis of probabilistic accident consequence codes, 
COSYMA (EU) and MACCS (USNRC), and provides extensive references..  
The joint EU-USNRC uncertainty quantification was initiated and funded jointly by the 
European Commission and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission between 1990 and 2000. 
Although precise cost estimates have not been retrieved, a ballpark estimate for the entire study, 
including expert remuneration ($15,000 per expert) is US$7 million (2010). The joint study 
builds on the earlier NUREG-1150 expert judgment exercise (Hora and Iman 1989). There were 
2,036 elicitation variables, assessed by 69 experts spread over nine panels. In total, 15,422 
individual expert-variable elicitations were performed. 
The reports from this study and selected supporting documents are listed in the 
references. Also included are links and websites from which digitized reports may be 
downloaded. 
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Background and Purpose of EU-USNRC Studies 
Accident consequence codes model the adverse consequences of potential accidents in 
nuclear power plants. Separate codes have been developed with support from the European 
Commission (COSYMA) and by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MACCS). The 
scope of these models is depicted in Figure 1.  
The objectives of the project were as follows: 
•  to formulate a generic, state-of-the-art methodology for uncertainty estimation that is 
capable of finding broad acceptance; 
•  to apply the methodology to estimate uncertainties associated with the predictions of 
probabilistic accident consequence codes designed for assessing the risk associated with 
nuclear power plants; and 
•  to quantify better and obtain more valid estimates of the uncertainties associated with 
probabilistic accident consequence codes, thus enabling more informed judgments to be 
made in the areas of risk comparison and acceptability and therefore to help set priorities 
for future research. Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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Figure 1. Scope of Accident Consequence Codes 
 
Uncertainty analyses had been performed with predecessors of both codes, whereby the 
probability distributions were assigned primarily by the code developers, based largely on 
literature reviews, rather than by independent experts. Since many input variables, as well as the 
models themselves, were uncertain, a rigorous and transparent procedure was required to arrive 
at defensible uncertainty distributions. Both commissions decided to pool their efforts to quantify 
uncertainty on physical variables and to perform uncertainty analyses on each code separately. 
The uncertainty quantification was broken into nine separate panels; the number of experts in 
each panel is shown in Table 1. Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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Table 1. Expert Panels 
Expert panel  Experts*  Year  Reference 
Atmospheric dispersion  8  1993  Harper et al. 1995 
Cooke et al. 1995 
Deposition (wet and dry)  8  1993  Harper et al. 1995 
Cooke et al. 1995 
Behavior of deposited material and its related doses  10  1995  Goossens et al. 1997 
Food chain on animal transfer and behavior  7  1995  Brown et al. 1997 
Food chain on plant and soil transfer and processes  4  1995  Brown et al. 1997 
Internal dosimetry  6  1996  Goossens et al. 1998 
Early health effects  7  1996  Haskin et al. 1997 
Late health effects  10  1996  Little et al. 1997 
Countermeasures  9  2000  Goossens et al. 2001 
* The goal was to have half of the experts coming from Europe and the other half coming from the United States. 
This was not achieved in all panels, for various reasons. 
Expert Judgment Methodology 
The expert judgment methodology is extensively described in the referenced reports; 
suffice here to indicate a few principal features: 
1.  Experts are nominated and selected via a traceable and defensible procedure. 
2.  Experts undergo a training and familiarization session. 
3.  Experts prepare their responses prior to the elicitations. 
4.  Elicitations are conducted individually by a “domain expert” familiar with the subject 
matter and a “normative expert” experienced in probabilistic assessment. 
5.  Experts are queried only about the possible results of physical measurements or 
experiments, and about possible correlations. 
6.  With a few exceptions, experts also quantify uncertainty with respect to “seed” or 
“calibration” variables whose true values are or become known within the time frame 
of the study.  
7.  Experts write up their assessment rationales, which are published as appendices to the 
reports. Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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8.  Experts’ names and assessments are preserved for peer review, and their names and 
assessments are published, but names are not associated with assessments in the open 
literature. 
Point (8) is characteristic of most structured expert judgment studies and is designed to 
discourage “expert shopping,” whereby stakeholders or interveners cherry-pick experts to 
buttress a predefined viewpoint.  
Point (6) is designed to enable performance assessment and validation of the resulting 
combined distributions. Since expert assessments are by their nature subjective, the attempt is 
made to “calibrate” these assessments against true values of variables from the expert’s field. 
Performance is measured in two dimensions, statistical accuracy and informativeness. Statistical 
accuracy is measured as the p-value of the hypothesis that the expert’s probabilistic statements 
are accurate in a statistical sense. Informativeness (Shannon relative information) measures the 
degree to which an expert’s distributions are concentrated on a narrow range of possible values. 
Table 2 shows the number of elicitation questions and number of calibration questions (“seeds”) 
for each panel. 
Table 2. Number of Elicitation Variables and Calibration Variables, by Panel  
Expert panel  Questions  Seeds  Remarks  
Atmospheric dispersion  77  23   
Deposition (wet and dry)  87  19  14 for dry depos. 
 5 for wet depos. 
Behavior of deposited material and its related doses  505  0  No seed questions  
Food chain on animal transfer and behavior*  80 8   
Food chain on plant or soil transfer and processes  244  31   
Internal dosimetry  332  55   
Early health effects  489  15   
Late health effects  111  8  Post hoc values 
Countermeasures
**  111 0  Country  specific 
* Since livestock practices are different in Europe and the United States, the questionnaires were adapted for 
European and American experts.  
** The Countermeasures panel was not part of the joint USNRC-CEC project but was in the EC follow-up project 
on uncertainty analysis of the COSYMA software package. 
The experts’ assessments were combined according to two weighting schemes. The 
equal-weight scheme assigned each expert equal weight, and the performance-based weighting 
scheme assigned experts a weight based on their performance on calibration variables. Each 
scheme can be regarded as a virtual expert whose statistical accuracy and informativeness can be Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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assessed in the same way as that of the experts. Table 3 shows the performance of these two 
weighting schemes.  
As a general conclusion, the performance-based decisionmaker exhibits better statistical 
accuracy and higher informativeness. In most cases, the equal-weight decisionmaker exhibits 
acceptable statistical accuracy. In one panel (Food chain on soil and plant transfer and 
processes), the statistical accuracy of both decisionmakers was problematic. This was attributed 
to the small number of experts (only four) in this panel. For programmatic reasons, primarily to 
ensure methodological consistency with the earlier NUREG-1150 study1 that addressed 
uncertainties in Level 1 and Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), the equal-weight 
decisionmaker was used for the uncertainty analyses, though both decisionmakers are made 
available, leaving the choice to the discretion of the user. 
Table 3. Performance Scores for Equal Weight- and  






Dispersion Perform    0.9  1.024 
        Equal    0.15  0.811 
Dry Deposition  Perform   0.52  1.435 
         Equal    0.001  1.103 
Wet Deposition  Perform   0.25  1.117 
         Equal    0.001  0.793 
Animal Perform    0.75  2.697 
          Equal    0.55  1.778 
Soil and Plant  Perform   0.0001  1.024 
         Equal    0.0001  0.973 
Internal Dose  Perform   0.85  0.796 
         Equal    0.11  0.56 
Early Health  Perform   0.23  0.216 
         Equal    0.07  0.165 
Late Health  Equal    ******* 0.28 
Point (5) requires that experts assess uncertainty only with regard to observable variables; 
that is, they do not assess uncertainty on abstract modeling parameters. Indeed, all models are 
simplifications, and large codes necessarily employ simplified models. The dispersion models in 
                                                 
1 NUREG 1150 dealt with level 1 and level 2 PSAs, loss of primary systems and loss of containment. Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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the codes, for example, employ simple Gaussian models with simple schemes for classifying 
atmospheric stability. More sophisticated models are available but impose a computational 
burden that does not comport with the computational demands of probabilistic consequence 
model. Experts are not required to “buy into” the models used in the codes, and indeed, their 
assessments could be used to quantify models other than those used in the consequence codes.  
The restriction to observable query variables means that experts’ distributions must be 
“pulled back” onto the parameter space of the models via a process known as probabilistic 
inversion. In short, distributions on model parameters must be found, such that when pushed 
through the models, the results on the observable quantities agree to the extent possible with the 
(combined) expert distributions. The development of practical techniques for probabilistic 
inversion was one of the major achievements of this research project. 
Lessons Learned  
The joint EU-USNRC uncertainty studies represent a benchmark in each of the 
submodeling areas addressed as well as in quantifying the uncertainty in the risk of nuclear 
power plants. Moreover, with their reliance on observable query variables, they represent a major 
methodological advance in the use of structured expert judgment. The major lessons learned are 
elaborated below. 
1. Value of Structured Expert Judgment Process 
Structured expert judgment treats the entire uncertainty quantification process as a 
scientific data collection activity. The value of following a structured and transparent process, as 
opposed to “best guesses” and “engineering judgment,” is very large.  
One benefit resides in clarifying the operational meaning of the variables whose 
uncertainty is quantified. When modelers adopt values adapted from published literature, it may 
happen that the operational meaning of the published error bars is not the meaning required in 
the uncertainty analysis. Thus, error bars for dispersion coefficients reported from tracer 
experiments reflect the variability in the estimates if the entire measurement procedure were 
often repeated. This is comparable to fluctuations of sample means under repeated experiments. 
However, the consequence codes are not concerned with an “average” accident, and the target 
uncertainty concerns downwind concentrations following a single release event. The difference 
between these two uncertainties is considerable (see Kurowicka and Cooke 2006). Figures 2 and 
3 show the 5, 50, and 95 percentiles of the lateral spread of a plume in stability conditions D. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distributions developed by the modelers at the National Radiological Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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Protection Board (NRPB) and KernForschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KFK). Figure 3 is the result 
of structured expert judgment. 
A second major benefit in structured expert judgment lies in capturing the experts’ 
reasoning in published rationales. These not only illustrate the different thought processes 
underlying the uncertainty assessments, they also provide valuable introductions to the modeling 
issues.  




Figure 3. 5%, 50%, and 95% Plume Widths (Stability D) Computed by EU-USNRC 
Uncertainty Analysis 
 Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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2. Dependence Modeling and Dependence Elicitation 
Prior to the joint study, the question of probabilistic dependence was largely ignored, as if 
all important dependences were captured in functional relationships, and as if dependence 
between random variables could be ignored. Of course, this is not remotely true, as best 
illustrated with a few examples from the joint study:  
•  the uncertainties in effectiveness of supportive treatment for high radiation exposure in 
people over 40 and people under 40;  
•  the amount of radioactivity after one month in the muscle of beef and dairy cattle; and 
•  the transport of radionuclides through different soil types. 
The joint study had to break new ground in dependence modeling and dependence 
elicitation, and these subjects are treated extensively in the documentation. The format for 
eliciting dependence was to ask about joint exceedence probabilities: “Supposing the 
effectiveness of supportive treatment in people over 40 was observed to be above the median 
value, what is the probability that the effectiveness of supportive treatment in people under 40 
would also be above its median value?” Experts quickly became familiar with this format. 
Dependent bivariate distributions were found by taking the minimally informative copula that 
reproduced these exceedence probabilities and linking them together in a Markov tree structure. 
Further developments, generalizing both the choice of copula and the tree dependence structure, 
are found in Kurowicka and Cooke (2006).  
3. Validation of Probabilistic Assessments 
Calibration or seed variables were used to assess expert and combined expert 
performance as probabilistic assessors. Considerable effort went into finding appropriate 
calibration variables. This has the multiple benefit of raising awareness that subjective 
probabilities are amenable to objective empirical control, and enhancing credibility in the 
combined assessments.  
4. Combination Methods 
 Some practitioners believe that expert probabilities should not be combined but simply 
be presented as multiple views. There is no doubt that individual expert assessments should be 
part of the published record. However, it is quite unthinkable that all possible combinations of 
experts in diverse panels should be carried forward to constitute the overall output. Referring to 
Table 1, this would mean that more than 67 million possible combinations of experts in the 
various panels would be carried through the entire uncertainty analysis and presented to the user. Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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There is no practical alternative but to combine the experts in each panel. The equal-weight 
alternative was used in the NUREG-1150 studies, but the notion that this is the only way of 
combining experts was criticized. Indeed, equal weighting tends to produce distributions that are 
significantly more diffuse than any of those provided by experts. Having a well-founded 
alternative to equal weighting deflects such criticism. 
5. Probabilistic Inversion 
Essential to the success of the joint study was the decision to query experts only about 
outcomes of possible measurements. This relieved experts of the burden of assessing parameters 
of models to which they might not subscribe. Instead, observable quantities were identified that 
were predicted by the models, and experts were queried on these. New mathematical techniques 
were developed to pull these distributions back onto the parameter space of the models. These 
techniques have been further developed since the joint study (Kraan 2002; Kraan and Bedford 
2005; Kurowicka and Cooke 2006), and probabilistic inversion is now faster, more flexible, and 
better grounded mathematically.  
6. Sensitivity Analysis and Communication 
Extracting useful information from the wealth of data emerging from a large-scale 
uncertainty analysis is a daunting task. The joint study explored several methods of gauging the 
importance of the input variables. At the end of the study, however, there was little time to study 
optimal ways of packaging this information for users. Subsequent work (van Noortwijk and 
Cooke 2000) further explored graphical communication methods. Figure 4 shows one such tool, 
developed to illustrate the potential influence of 161 variables on high values of collective 
radiation dose to six critical organs. A local sensitivity measure was used to capture the influence 
of the variables on the high-dose regime. A radar graph represents all this information in one 
image. In A3 format, this gives all the relationships at once, although in normal A4 format it is 
rather dense.  Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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7. Volitional Uncertainty 
Volitional uncertainty is uncertainty with regard to what people will do. First-person 
uncertainty is uncertainty with regard to what I will do. This type of uncertainty cannot be 
represented as subjective probability. Uncertainty with regard to what other people will do, 
however, can be so represented. In the Countermeasures module, the joint study had to confront 
the issue of volitional uncertainty. The reports propose uncertainty distributions for problem 
owners, risk managers, and local officials, and indeed some of these people were also experts in 
the panel. Consistent with the overall starting point, uncertainty regarding what people will do 
must be queried in a way that is divorced from the question of what the expert himself or herself Resources for the Future  Cooke and Kelly 
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would do. People’s actions in the event of an accident must be treated as unknown but 
potentially observable values of physical measurements.  
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